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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: USE AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXECuTIVE ORDERS
Introduction
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."1 With these words the framers of the Constitution created the office of
the president, who is the head of the executive branch of the government - the
administrative director to whom the heads of governmental departments and
agencies are responsible.2
As Chief Executive and administrative director, the president possesses the
power to issue instructions and orders to executive officers concerning the per-
formance of their duties.s One of the first examples of such instructions was
President Jefferson's order to Secretary of State Madison to withhold delivery of
a judicial commission of appointment from Marbury.4 Such a directive has come
to be termed an executive order. Closely related to executive orders are presidential
proclamations. Although there has been no legal definition of the two terms,5
executive orders may be classified as all directives of ihe president which are
directed to, and govern actions of, governmental officials and agencies. Because
they are directed to governmental officials, executive orders generally have only
an indirect effect upon the individual. Proclamations, on the other hand, are
directed at the individual. Because the president's power is more limited in the
area of individual activities than governmental activities, proclamations are gen-
erally hortatory in nature and not legally binding. Although the difference between
the two may be one of form rather than substance, this distinction is the one most
often advanced.
I. History of Executive Orders
A. Use
Beginning with George Washington, presidents have issued documents which
may be described as executive orders. The earlier executive orders were used for
such purposes as the withdrawal of public lands for Indian use, for the erection
of lighthouses, the establishment, transfer, and abolition of land districts and land
offices, and for supplementing acts of Congress2. Later executive orders were em-
ployed to set aside land for water, timber, fuel, hay, signal stations, target ranges,
and bird sanctuaries.8 During World War I they were used to set up such agencies
as the War Trade Board, the Committee of Public Information, the Food Adminis-
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2 The president can appoint officers of the United States, with the advice and con-
sent of Congress, and can require written reports from them on their official duties. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2. The law recognizes that a special relationship exists between the president
and the department heads. The acts of department heads within the scope of their powers
are in law the acts of the president. Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755 (1879). Department
heads are also bound by statutes, and where Congress makes the act to be performed by
the department head ministerial, the performance of the act is judicially enforceable. Dunlap
v. United States, 173 U.S. 65 (1898). In fact, Congress may confer executive or administra-
tive powers which are not Constitutionally reserved to the president upon other executive
officers. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1839). A department head,
therefore, may be the servant of two masters.
3 The president cannot force the department heads to disregard the statutes of Congress
[Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1839)], nor may he thus contravene
public policy determined by Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
4 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
5 Even Executive Order 10006 governing the issuance of Executive orders and procla-
mations does not define the two terms.
6 See, e.g., LAw DAY, U.S.A., 1962 27 Fed. Reg. 549 (1962) and MOTHER'S DAY, 1962
27 Fed. Reg. 4757 (1962).
7 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 470 (1915).
8 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TIH CONG., 1ST SEss., EXECUTIVE
ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 35 (Comm.
Print 1957).
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tration, and the Grain Corporation.9 The greatest use of the executive order was
made by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the early 1930's.10 This period was the high-water
mark of the use of executive orders; since then their use has declined. However,
a change in their character has accompanied this decline. The executive order,
which has historically been an administrative directive, has assumed an ever in-
creasing legislative character. In 1952 President Truman "seized" the steel mills;"'
in 1953 the heads of the contracting agencies were ordered to enforce the non-
discrimination clause in government contracts; 2 and in 1962 President Kennedy
issued Executive Order 11063 entitled Equal Opportunity in Housing.1"
These latter executive orders have met with varied success. The steel "seizure"
was defeated; and the nondiscrimination clause has been successfully enforced by
indirect and extralegal means. Executive Order 11063 is hardly a year old and
has not been legally enforced; however, the ramifications of its provisions' 4 are
extensive.
9 Id. at 36.
10 In 1933, 654 executive orders were issued. In 1934 and 1935 respectively, 467 and
383 executive orders were issued. In 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956, there were issued 89,
72, 64, and 24 executive orders. Since President Kennedy has taken office, the number has
risen.
11 Executive Order 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
12 Executive Order 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953).
13 Executive Order 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
14 * * *
Section 101. I hereby direct all departments and agencies in the
executive branch of the Federal Government, insofar as their functions
relate to the provision, rehabilitation, or operation of housing and related
facilities, to take all action necessary and appropriate to prevent discrimina-
tion because of race, color, creed, or national origin -(a) in the sale, leasing, rental, or other disposition of residential
property and related facilities (including land to be developed for resi-
dential use), or in the use of occupancy thereof, if such property and
related facilities are -
(i) owned or operated by the Federal Government, or(ii) provided in whole or in part with the aid of loans, advances,
grants, or contributions hereafter agreed to be made by the Federal Govern-
ment, or
(iii) provided in whole or in part by loans hereafter insured,
guaranteed, or otherwise secured by the credit of the Federal Government,
or
(iv) provided by the development or redevelopment of real property
purchased, leased, or otherwise obtained from a State or local public
agency receiving Federal financial assistance for slum clearance or urban
renewal with respect to such real property under a loan or grant contract
hereafter entered; and
(b) in the lending practices with respect to residential property
and related facilities (including land to be developed for residential use)
of lending institutions, insofar as such practices relate to loans hereafter
insured or guaranteed by the Federal Government.
Part III - Enforcement
Sec. 301. * * *
Sec. 302. If any executive department or agency subject to this
order concludes that any person or firm . . . or any State or local public
agency has violated any rule . . . adopted pursuant to this order, or any
nondiscrimination provision included in any agreement or contract pursuant
to any such rule . . . it shall endeavor to end and remedy such violation
by informal means . . . a department or agency may take such action as
may be appropriate under its governing laws, including, but not limited
to, the following:
It may -(a) cancel or terminate in whole or in part any agreement or
contract with such person, firm, or State or local public agency providing
for a loan, grant, contribution, or other Federal aid, or for the payment
of a commission or fee;
(b) refrain from extending any further aid under any program
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B. Organization
Until the Federal Register Act of 1935,1s the state of executive orders was one
of chaos, which, to a great degree, was due to the informality with which they
were treated by the presidents. On a number of occasions a president wrote "I
approve," "Approved," "Let it be done," or other similar words on the bottom of
a recommendation drawn up by a Cabinet member. Executive order 396 is-
sued in 1906 was not even dated, and since the Federal Register Act had not yet
been passed, it became effective as soon as the Secretary of State sealed and at-
tested to it.'" Until 1907, executive orders were not even numbered. 1 7 Perhaps
the best example of the disorder which reigned is well illustrated in the 1930's by the
fact that on one occasion the United States Government was forced to ask the
Supreme Court to dismiss a governmental appeal because it was based upon a
regulation which no longer existed.18
In 1935 and 1936, two events occurred which gave order to the chaos into
which executive orders had fallen. In 1935 President Roosevelt approved the
Federal Register Act' 9 which alleviated the problems of publication and notice
by specifying that various documents, including any "Presidential proclamation or
Executive order and any order . . . issued .. . by a Federal agency" 20 shall be
published in the Federal Register. This section of the act also defined the term
"Federal agency" or "Agency" so as to include the President of the United States.21
Then, in 1936, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 729822 which prescribed
the manner in which proposed executive orders and proclamations were to be
prepared.23
administered by it and affected this order until it is satisfied that the af-
fected person, firm, or State or local public agency will comply with the
rules . . . adopted pursuant to this order, and any nondiscrimination pro-
visions included in any agreement or contract;
(c) refuse to approve a lending institution or any other lender as a
beneficiary under any program administered by it which is affected by
this order or revoke such approval if previously given.
Sec. 303. In appropriate cases executive departments and agencies
shall refer to the Attorney General violations of any rules . . . adopted
pursuant to this order, or violations of any nondiscrimination provisions
included in any agreement or contract, for such civil or criminal action
as he may deem appropriate.
15 49 Stat. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
16 Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191 (1872).
17 Numbering seems to have begun in 1907 when the Department of State began to
assign numbers to all executive orders which it had on file. Back orders which were later
added were given in-between numbers, while some orders were never numbered at all be-
cause they were never discovered by the Department of State. It has been estimated that
the number of unnumbered executive orders is between 15,000 and 20,000. The executive
order which is Executive Order 1 was issued by President Lincoln on October 20, 1862. COM-
MITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., Op. cit. supra note 8, at 37.
18 GOVERNMENT IN IGNORANCE OF THE LAw - A PLEA FOR BETTER PUBLICATION OF
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION, 48 HARV. L. REv. 198, 204 (1934).
19 49 Stat. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. §301 (1958).
20 49 Stat. 501 (1953), 44 U.S.C. § 305 (1935).
21 Ibid.
22 1 Fed. Reg. 2284 (1936).
23 Executive Order 7298 was superseded by Executive Order 10006 and then Executive
Order 11030 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (1962), which provides:
Section 1. Form. Proposed Executive orders and proclamations shall
be prepared in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The order or proclamation shall be given a suitable title.
(b) The order of proclamation shall contain a citation of authority
under which it is issued.
(c) Punctuation, capitalization, spelling. ...
Sec. 2. Routing and approval of drafts. (a) A proposed Executive
NOTES
II. Scope of Executive Orders
A. Extent of Presidential Power
From the nation's very beginning the nature and limitations of presidential
power have been controversial. Article II, Section I of the Constitution states
that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." Whether or not the term "executive power" is a mere summary descrip-
tion of powers which are granted in more specific terms in the following provisions
of the article or is a specific grant of power has been a subject of dispute ever
since the article was written.
One of the first controversies over the interpretation of the "executive power"
clause arose in 1793. England had declared war against France, and anti-British
feeling ran high, as did pro-French sympathy. A bitter struggle arose in Washing-
ton's Cabinet whether the president should issue a proclamation ". . . for the
purpose of preventing interference of the citizens of the United States in the war
between France and Great Britain .... 124 On April 22, 1793, Washington issued
a proclamation enjoining United States citizens from ". . . all acts and proceedings
whatsoever, which ... tend to contravene such disposition.. ." of ". . . a conduct
friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers .. .,,2" under pain of prosecu-
tion. The issuance of this proclamation precipitated the dispute between Pacificus
(Hamilton) and Helvidius (Madison). Hamilton supported the Constitutionality
of the proclamation saying:
... first, that the opening clause of Article II is a grant of power; secondly,
that the succeeding more specific grants of the article, except when "coupled
with express restrictions or limitations," "specify the principle articles"
implied in the general grant and hence serve to interpret it; thirdly - by
inference - that the direction of foreign policy is inherently an "executive"
function.26
Madison felt that the proclamation was unconstitutional and took the contrary
position, saying that if the president possessed the power to issue such a proclamation
it took from Congress the right to choose between war and peace, a right which
was opposed to the Constitutional right to declare war.2 7 The dispute was ended
the following year when Congress passed America's first neutrality act. Since
then, the subject of neutrality has been conceded to lie within the jurisdiction of
Congress.28 Although Hamilton technically lost the dispute, his conception of the
"executive power" clause has played an important part in later Constitutional law.
In 1926 in Meyers v. United States,29 the Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether or not the president has exclusive power to remove officers
of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the consent of the
order or proclamation shall first be submitted, with seven copies thereof,
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, together with a letter,
signed by the head or other properly authorized officer of the originating
Federal agency, explaining the nature, purpose, background, and effect
of the proposed Executive order or proclamation and its relationship, if any,
to pertinent laws and other Executive orders or proclamations.
(b) If the Director of the Bureau of the Budget approves the pro-
posed Executive order of proclamation, he shall transmit it to the Attorney
General for his consideration as to both form and legality.
Sec. 5. Proclamations of treaties excluded. Consonant with the pro-
visions of Section 12 of the Federal Register Act (49 Stat. 503; 44 U.S.C.
312), nothing in this order shall be construed to apply to treaties, con-
ventions, protocols, or other international agreements, or proclamations
thereof by the President.
24 THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793, 26 (1931).
25 Id. at 42.
26 CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS, 179 (4th ed. 1957).
27 Id. at 181.
28 Ibid.
29 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Senate. In 1876 Congress had provided that "Postmasters of the first, second, and
third classes . .. may be removed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate .. ."3o The president precipitated the controversy when he ordered
the Postmaster General to remove a first-class postmaster. In holding that the
president's removal power is unrestricted, the Court adopted Hamilton's theory of
the "executive power" clause, saying that:
The executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific
terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed, and the fact that no express
limit was placed on the power of removal by the Executive was convincing
indication that none was intended.3 1
Ten years later, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,3 2 the Court
adopted Hamilton's "inherently executive" view of the president's role in the field
of foreign relations. The question was whether or not Congress could delegate to
the president the power to impose an impartial arms embargo on Bolivia and
Paraguay during the Chaco War whenever he felt such an embargo would con-
tribute to the maintaining or securing of peace between the two countries. The
Court answered the question "yes" and proceeded further and said that the presi-
dent is the sole representative of the government in the conduct of foreign affairs;
this proposition has today become an accepted fact.33
With the pre-emption of the field of foreign relations came the power to
enter into international agreements, yet:
[N]owhere in the Constitution can there be found an explicit provision
granting to the President the power to conclude international agreements
without the sanction of Congress or the Senate.... The President's author-
ity to enter an agreement which becomes an international obligation of
the United States is so indispensable to his power to initiate foreign policy
that it may reasonably be derived by implication from the language of
the Constitution. Article I, section 10, which states that "No State shall
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" and that "No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress .. . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power," indicates that the
Constitution itself recognizes the existence of international agreements
other than treaties. Since power to make these agreements was accorded
to the states with congressional consent, it would be difficult to conclude,
and has never been concluded, that this power was denied to the Federal
Government. And, in order to prevent his substantive powers under Article
II from being in large measure ineffectual, the President must share in
this federal power. Moved by practical considerations, and fortified by
'inferences from constitutional language, the courts have recognized that
the President does possess this power... And the Congress has .. .acceptedhis exercise of such power.34
Executive agreements are generally considered as being akin to treaties, but
in addition, they may be likened to executive orders. Although the addresses differ,
like executive orders, such agreements spring from the presidential power and
possess as much validity and obligation as if they had proceeded from the legislative
branch of the government3 s In United States v. Pink,3 6 and United States v.
Belmont,37 the Court gave effect to the terms of an executive agreement made
without Congressional authorization even though the implementation of this agree-
ment required the contravention of the laws of the state of New York.
30 19 Stat. 80, 81 (1876).
31 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926). Nine years later the Supreme
Court confined the removal power of the president to "all purely executive officers."
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-628 (1935).
32 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
33 CoRwm, THE PRESmENT, OFFICES AND POWERS, 177 (4th ed. 1957).
34 Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L. J. 345, 351 (1954). This work contains a comprehensive treatment of
executive agreements.
35 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
36 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
37 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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A second augmentation of presidential power is exemplified in In re Neagle.ss
Theodore Roosevelt explained this power as the "Stewardship Theory." The facts
of the case were these: The United States attorney general ordered Neagle, a
United States marshal, to act as Justice Field's bodyguard because-threats had
been made against the justice's life. In the course of his duty, Neagle shot and
killed a man; Neagle was arrested for the homicide and sought release on a writ
of habeas corpus, which could be granted if he was acting in pursuance of a law
of the United States. The Court held that the attorney general's order should be
treated as a law because it was presumably made with the president's consent, and
the Court recognized that the president's duty is not limited " . . . to the enforce-
ment of the acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States according to their
express terms," but includes " . . . the rights, duties, and obligations growing out
of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection im-
plied by the nature of the government under the Constitution. ' 9
In re Debs, e decided five years later, supported the Neagle decision. In pur-
suance to an order from the White House, the United States attorney general
sought and received an injunction against the Pullman strike in Chicago, for the
violation of which Debs was jailed for contempt. The question before the Court
was whether or not a federal court had power to issue such an injunction. The
Court said:
[W]hile it is not the province of the government to interfere in any mere
matter of private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers
to enforce the rights of one against another, yet, whenever wrongs com-
plained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of
matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation,
and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the Govern-
ment has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to ex-
clude it from the courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully
discharge those constitutional duties.41
In both the Neagle case and the Debs case, the Court attributes powers to
the president in his executive capacity because such powers belong to the United
States; i.e., to the national government as a whole.42
The validity of certain executive action was questioned when the Constitu-
tionality of Executive Order 10340 was attacked.4 This order directed the Secre-
tary of Commerce to "seize" the steel mills. In 1953 the Supreme Court held the
order to be unconstitutional.44 Professor Corwin, a noted writer on this subject,
feels that the case is of value to Constitutional law and practice because it affirms:
That the president does possess "residual" or "resultant" powers over and
above, or in consequence of, his specifically granted powers to take
temporary alleviative action in the presence of serious emergency is a
proposition to which all but Justices Black and Douglas would probably
have assented in the absence of the complicating issue that was created
by the President's refusal to follow the procedures laid down in the Taft-
Hartley Act. 45
Thus,
To Summarize: The President's power as Chief Executive is multidimen-
sional, and has expanded along almost every dimension. His role as
interpreter of the law has become, with the watering down in recent times
of the Lockian maxim against the delegation of legislative power, a power
of quasi-legislation and, in times of emergency, power of legislation un-
qualified by "the softening word quasi." His power as Commander-in-
38 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
39 Id. at 64.
40 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
41 Id. at 586.
42 CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICES AND POWERS, 152 (4th ed. 1957).
43 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
44 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1953).
45 Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. Ryv.
53, 65 (1953).
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Chief to employ the armed forces to put down "combinations too power-
ful to be dealt with by ordinary judicial processes" is, in the absence of
definitely restrictive legislation, almost plenary, as is also his power to
employ preventive (as against punitive) martial law. Furthermore, the
line that today separates the "peace of the United States" from the domestic
peace of the states severally has been since the First World War a tenuous
one. The third source of the President's power as Chief Executive is
the theory that attributes to him the responsibility of "stewardship" to
act for the public good so far at least as the laws do not inhibit.46
The following are illustrative of the sweep of the power exercisable through
the executive order. He can declare martial law,4 7 enforce the laws of the United
States, 48 and remove executive officers.4 9 In addition to the president's constitu-
tionally inherent powers, his powers may be augmented by Congress; 50 and when-
ever an executive order or proclamation is founded upon constitutional or delegated
authority, it has the force of public law,51 the violation of which may be made
punishable by Congress.5 2 Moreover, an executive order or proclamation which
exceeds presidential authority may be ratified by Congress, with the same result
as if the order or proclamation were issued after the statute was enacted.
53
B. Limits Upon Executive Power
Whatever the extent of presidential power may be, it is nevertheless limited
by Congress. The legislative function of the government has been entrusted to
Congress, with the result that neither the president nor an agency head,54 who
acts at the president's direction, may contravene a statutory provision.5 5 The courts
will strike down such an order even when it emanates from a Constitutionally
enumerated power like that of Commander-in-Chief. 5 In issuing an executive or-
der, the president must conform to the standards laid down in a Congressional
delegation of authority, and must also state the existence of the particular cir-
cumstances and conditions which authorize such order.5
7
Presidential power is also limited by Congressional declarations of public
policy. The determination of public policy is within the province of the legisla-
tive branch of the government, and the executive branch may only apply the
policy so fixed and determined, and may not itself determine matters of public
policy or change the policy laid down by the legislature.5s Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer stated that:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
46 CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICES AND POWERS, 168-9 (4th ed. 1957).
47 Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863). This power was limited in ex parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2 (1866).
48 Ia re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Taken together,
these two cases imply that there is a "peace of the United States" which the president may
take active measures to protect.
49 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). This case was severely limited by
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
51 Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546 (1892); Moehl v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
84 F.Supp. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1947).
52 Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506 (1910).
53 Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
54 An act of a department head, within the field of his jurisdiction, is considered in
law to be an act of the president, even though there has been no specific written delegation
from the president, and even though only presidential action is authorized. Wolsey v. Chap-
man, 101 U.S. 755 (1879).
55 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838); United States v. Guy Capps, Inc., 204
F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
56 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
57 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
58 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Broos v. Barton, 142
F.2d 690 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
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rely upon his own Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential
control in such a case only by disabling Congress from acting upon the
subject.59
Justice Frankfurter entertained similar thoughts, but complicated 'the issue by
considering the duration of the seizure:
We must . . . put to one side consideration of what powers the President
would have had if there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the
authority asserted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a
short, explicitly temporary period, to be terminated automatically un-
less Congressional approval were given.60
Whatever contribution Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. has made to constitutional
law,6' it does reaffirm the principle that the president is subservient to Congres-
sionally declared public policy.
III. Enforcement
As previously stated,62 executive orders are directives to governmental officials
and agericies. Enforcement of these orders falls into two major categories: ad-
ministrative and judicial enforcement. Administrative enforcement comprehends
the action taken if a governmental official refuses to execute an order or to apply
indirect compulsion to an individual to effectuate a policy established through an
executive order. Judicial enforcement may be obtained both by the government if
affirmative action is necessary, and by an individual who feels that he has been
injured.
A. Administrative Enforcement
Against governmental officials - Direct enforcement of executive orders in
this area is not difficult because of the hierarchical division of authority which
exists in the executive department and the prestige of the presidential office. In
the event that an executive order were disobeyed, either discharge or mandamus
would suffice to insure the order's performance.
Against individuals - Because executive orders are generally self-enforcing,
once the government official acts the order is carried out. To illustrate: President
Jefferson's order was enforced as soon as Madison withheld the judicial commis-
sion of appointment from Marbury;6 3 and President Truman's order was enforced
as soon as the American Flag was flown over the steel mills.64 In each of these
cases, no affirmative action was required of the government.
Certain executive orders, however, are not self-enforcing, with the result that
the government must affirmatively enforce them. One such class are those orders
which deal with discrimination.65 Although the government has not yet attempted to
judicially enforce one of these orders, but has solely relied on persuasion, 6 there
are a number of possible weapons available.
a. No more contracts - One of the most effective means of enforcing the non-
discrimination clause in government contracts is the refusal to let additional con-
tracts to those persons or companies which discriminate. Similarly, President
Kennedy's executive order Equal Opportunity in Housing7 contains a specific
59 343 U.S. 579, 637-638 (1952).
60 Id. at 597.
61 For an analysis of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. case, see CoRwiN, op. cit. supra
note 45.
62 See note 7 supra.
63 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
64 Youngstown Sheet & Tube 'Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
65 Executive Order 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Equal Opportunity in Housing); and
Executive Order 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Con-
tracts).
66 Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. R. 837
(1957).
67 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
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provision to this effect, and the Supreme Court would probably approve it. In
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. the Court said that:
Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the
unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with
whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it
will make needed purchases.68
Although this statement is not unqualifiedly correct because it overlooks the fact
that the government and its agencies are subject to Constitutional limitations when
they act in a proprietary capacity, 69 the Court does recognize the vast contractual
power of the government. Such a power, if used, could deal a crippling blow to
all the discriminatory practices envisioned in both the contract and housing orders.
The only possible exception is the situation in which a single person or company
manufactures the needed article, in which case the government would be shorn
of its usual bargaining power and the supplier could refuse the government's terms
without injury.
b. Breach and termination of contract - Not only do government contracts
contain nondiscrimination clauses, but they also contain "Default" clauses7 0 which
permit the government to terminate the contract upon the breach of any of the
contract's provisions. 71 In effect, therefore, failure to perform any of the provi-
sions of the contract is a material breach.7 2 Although it is patently clear that in
entering into the contract the government's primary concern was the delivery of
the requested goods, that the nondiscrimination clause was only an incidental part
of the contract, and that the bargaining position of the parties to the contract
was vastly unequal, there seems little doubt that the judiciary would rely on free-
dom of contract73 and support the government's position. Obviously, termination
is a most potent weapon, but so far "it has been held in reserve. It may have a
certain in terrorem effect, but this is necessarily minimized by the obvious reluc-
tance of the Government to invoke it."74
68 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
69 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 128 (1959).
70 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-11 (1961).
71 Coons & Whelan, DEFAULT TERMINATION OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FIXED PRIcE
SUPPLY CONTRACTS, 32 NOTR DAME LAW. 189, 218 (1957).
72 It is readily apparent that in the absence of the default clause a breach of the non-
discrimination provision in the contract would not constitute a material breach. Hence the
government would be able to collect only nominal damages.
73 When speaking of government contracts it is interesting to note the words of Judge
Francis in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960):
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who
are brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other
on a footing of approximate economic equality. In such a society there is
no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as
a whole. But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract
has appeared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining
power and position. "The weaker party, in need of the goods or services,
is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either be-
cause the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or
artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual
intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by
the stronger party. . . . Such standardized contracts have been described
as those in which one predominant party will dictate its law to an unde-
termined multiple rather than to an individual. They are said to resemble
a law rather than a meeting of the minds."
74 Pasley, op. cit. supra note 66, at 852. At page 842 while discussing enforcement of
the clause, the author states that:
Under the old system, the nondiscrimination clause was simply a part of
the "boiler plate" included in all government contracts, which many con-
tractors never read or, paid no attention to even if they did read it. If
this should happen today, it is not for lack of Government effort to make
contractors realize that there is a nondiscrimination clause in their contract.
It appears to this writer that the government has not remedied the "boiler plate" status
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c. The liquidated damage clause - A provision for liquidated damages might,
be employed to enforce the nondiscrimination clause. However, since violation of
the clause would not subject the government to serious, if any, harm, a court
would probably construe the provision as a penalty clause75 and therefore void.
d. More direct compulsion - Subsections (b) and (c) of Section 302 of
Executive Order 11063, Equal Opportunity in Housing, authorize governmental
agencies to take more stringent coercive action. Such action consists in the pro-
hibition of lending federal funds to uncooperating individuals and the power to
refuse recognition to lending institutions that would be a beneficiary under any
federally administered housing program.
B. Judicial Enforcement
By the government - The normal governmental action involves defending a
suit brought by an aggrieved party.78
However, there are affirmative steps which the government could take to en-
force the nonself-enforcing executive orders such as the injunction.
c. Injunction and Liquidated damage clause - The future holds little promise
for the injunction as a means of enforcing the nondiscrimination clause, for an
injunction is generally granted only when the remedy at law is inadequate.7 In
the case of the nondiscrimination clause, there is good reason for believing not only
that the government's remedy at law is adequate, but that the government has
suffered no injury. But even assuming that there were no adequate remedy at law
and that the government did suffer harm,
There are . .. more substantial reasons why a court might be reluctant
to grant specific relief: (1) the difficulty of enforcing any such decree
and (2) the traditional hesitancy of courts of equity to grant specific per-
formance of employment contracts.78
Although Section 303 of Executive Order 11063, Equal Opportunity in Hous-
ing, authorizes the institution of criminal action against any violator of a non-
discrimination provision, it is not apparent what law or laws are envisioned to
have been violated. Until such legislation is enacted, Section 303 is meaningless.
By the individual - In 1946 Congress passed the Administrative Procedure
Act 9 which provides that:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion -(a) Right of Review. Any person suffering legal wrong because of
any agency action ... shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(b) Form and Venue of Action. The form of proceeding for judicial
review shall be any special statutory proceeding relevant to the subject
matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy
thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for
declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction
or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction .... 80Since agency is defined to include the president,8 ' a number of remedies are re-
of the clause because the weapons with which it has armed itself are too potent to use.
Instead, the government should have supplied more moderate means of enforcement - ones
that could be used uniformly and in every instance.
75 Restatement, Contracts, § 339 (1932) states that:(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages there-
fore, is not enforceable . . . unless(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation
for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
76 Some cases in which the government was forced to take the initiative: United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United
States v. Carpenter, 113 F. Supp. 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
77 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941).
78 Pasley, op. cit. supra note 66, at 853.
79 60 Stat. 237-244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1959).
80 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1959).
81 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S;C. § 1001 (1959).
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served for an injured party, the most important of which are the injunction and
declaratory judgment.
The injunction is of course an equitable remedy, and the theory
as expounded in the opinions is that the requirements of equity jurisdiction
- threat of irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law - must
be satisfied. But the injunction as a means of reviewing administrative
action has moved away from its historical foundations in equity and has
become a general-utility remedy for use whenever no other form of
review proceeding is clearly indicated.8 2
Other forms of proceedings which may be utilized by an aggrieved party to
test administrative action (executive orders) are: habeas corpus - to test the
legality of plaintiff's detention; s s resisting enforcement - defending an action
brought to enforce an executive order; 4 and mandatory relief.8 5
In a recent case"" a somewhat novel argument was advanced in an attempt
to enforce the nondiscrimination clause in a government contract. Plaintiff, a negro
citizen of Pennsylvania, was allegedly denied employment by the Philadelphia Elec-
tric Company because of his race. In his suit plaintiff claimed a right as a third
party beneficiary to recover damages for the breach of the contract between the
electric company and the government. Defendant motioned for dismissal (a) for
lack of jurisdiction, or (b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. Judge Luongo felt that the complaint could be interpreted as assert-
ing (1) a common law action for breach of contract, or (2) a cause of action
created by the executive order, but that under either interpretation the defendant's
motion should be granted.
Since there was no diversity of citizenship between the parties, plaintiff claimed
jurisdiction solely on the basis that the suit arose under the Constitution and
laws of the United States.87
Viewing the complaint as stating a cause of action under common law
contract principles and applying the test of Gully s s the Executive Order does
not create a right which is an essential element of plaintiff's cause of
action.
As stated earlier, however, it is possible to construe the complaint,
not as one based on common law contract principles, but as claiming a
cause of action created by an Executive Order. Under this latter view,
applying the principles enunciated in Montana-Dakota Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Co., 8 9 . . . [and see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)] plaintiff manages
to get over the jurisdictional hurdle, for simply by asserting that he has
a cause of action under a "law" of the United States, he has created
jurisdiction in this court to determine whether such a claim is well
founded, but by doing so he has created a problem for himself as to
whether he can set forth a cause of action. 0
Since no express private right of action was granted and since he felt a
private action was not to be implied, Judge Luongo granted defendant's motion
to dismiss.
Although the case never reached the merits, plaintiff's claim for damages
82 DAvis, op. cit. supra 69, at 423.
83 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
84 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
85 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 69, at 428-9.
86 Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 215 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
87 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
88 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936), wherein it was said that in
order to bring a case within the statute,
(A) right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of
action .... The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported
if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction
or effect, and defeated if they receive another.
89 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
90 Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 215 F. Supp. 729, 731-2 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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as a third party beneficiary is not entirely without substance?' or support. In
United States v. Carpenter92 the government asserted a right against the defendant
which arose out of an executive agreement. The United States, pursuant
to its farm program, had been supporting the price of table stock potatoes when
it discovered that such potatoes were being imported from Canada and thus in-
juring the program. In order to curtail the imports, the United States and Canada
entered into an executive agreement whereby Canada agreed to force all Ca-
nadian growers to acquire permits to export potatoes to the United States and
to make assurances that any potatoes exported to the United States would be
used only as seedlings and not as table stock. Defendant, after promising the seller
that he would use them only as seedling, imported potatoes from Canada and
proceeded to use them as table stock, whereupon the United States brought suit
for damages and an injunction.
Although the defendant was really challenging the validity of the executive
agreement, the Court avoided this issue by deciding that the contract between
the defendant and the Canadian grower was made for the benefit of the United
States, and that the United States was a third party beneficiary to the contract.
The Carpenter rationale could readily be applied to the set of facts in the Phila-
delphia Electric Co. case. Whereas the court in Carpenter was forced to stretch
the beneficiary doctrine in order to avoid the executive agreement issue, it could
apply the doctrine in cases of discrimination with much greater ease.
It appears that only one obstacle can prevent plaintiff's recovery. In order
for a cause of action to be created in a third party beneficiary there must have
existed such an intent in the minds of the parties to the contract. 93 In the case
of the nondiscrimination clause, it appears that this intent was lacking.94
Conclusion
The history of executive orders is, to a great extent, a narrative of the evolu-
tion of presidential power. From a rather humble beginning, the president has
become the head of a giant executive complex. As head of the executive de-
partment he rarely and only indirectly affects the rights of the individual. But
in addition to his power as chief executive, he possesses a certain amount of legis-
lative or quasi-legislative power which has devolved upon him, such as the power
to seize property (in spite of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.95), to conclude execu-
tive agreements, and to regulate government contracts. Of particular importance
is his control over government contracts, by which he may extensively and directly
affect the individual, as a glance at the contract and housing orders will indicate.
Thus far the power of enforcement of these executive orders has been con-
fined to the government. Although it is extremely -doubtful whether the president
could expressly grant a cause of action to an individual in order to enforce the
orders, there appears to be no reason why a private individual could not be given
third party rights which would arise not from any actual or supposed presidential
power, but from common law contract principles. If such rights are ever given,
or if the Philadelphia Electric Co. case holds that they have already been given,
a new dimension will be added to the enforcement of executive orders.
Robert B. Cash
91 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 357 (3rd ed. 1959):
A person is a donee beneficiary when "it appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purepose of
the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance
thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right
against the promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or as-
serted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary."
92 113 F. Supp. 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
93 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 133, 135, 145 (1932).
94 Pasley, op. cit. supra note 66, at 855.
95 Corwin, op. cit. supra note 45.
